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The Mediating Effect of Earnings Management on
Financial Performance: The Importance of Good Corporate
Governance
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Abstract

Purpose: This study investigates the effect of corporate governance on financial performance by
taking into account the mediating effect of earnings management.
Design: By using a structural equation modeling and partial least squares approach and a sample
of listed banks in Indonesia observed between 2010 and 2015, this research proves that good
corporate governance has a significant effect on earnings management and, in turn, that earnings
management has an adverse impact on a company's financial performance.
Findings: An increase in managerial and institutional ownership leads to a decrease in earnings
management, which can improve a company's financial performance.
Originality: This research shows that by applying good corporate governance mechanisms, a
company can avoid agency conflicts, minimize earnings manipulation by managers, and obtain
reliable company performance valuations. 4
JEL classification: G30, G34, O10, O16.
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INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance (CG) is a management concept that refers to all the mechanisms used to
control and monitor management performance as well as ensure corporate accountability to
stakeholders. The implementation of corporate governance mechanisms is strategically important
to achieve good corporate governance (GCG), which controls the performance of business entities.
GCG is expected to meet the demands of national and international stakeholders, thereby creating
value to achieve competitive advantage. The concept of GCG requires four key elements: fairness,
transparency, accountability and responsibility. The consistent application of these principles can
improve the quality of financial reporting and can become an obstacle to performance engineering
activities which results in financial reporting not reflecting the company's core values (Kaen, 2003;
Shaw, 2003). This concept has developed relatively since the 1990s. The concept of good corporate
governance has been known in the UK since 1992. Developed countries that are members of the
OECD Group (a group of developed countries in Western Europe and North America) were
implemented in 1999. In Indonesia, in Law no. 10 of 1998 concerning Banking, in general,
provisions related to GCG have been regulated, including the governance structure, governance
process, and governance outcome. In particular, regarding governance outcomes, Bank Indonesia
has also issued several regulations, including transparency regarding bank financial conditions and
increasing the role of external auditors. Banks are required to disclose non-performing loans
(NPLs), controlling shareholders and affiliates, and risk management practices in financial
reporting.
Corporate value and stakeholder value are determined by management's economic,
environmental, and social performance. These three aspects are known as the Triple Bottom Line
(Halpern et al., 2013). While environmental and social aspects are important for measuring a
company's performance, the firm's core value is still measured by financial performance, which is
closely linked to the rise and decline of stock prices and is easier to use to predict future company
performance. Stakeholders use earnings as a key indicator for economic decision making. Indeed,
they rely on it to make investment decisions; lenders rely on it to make credit decisions; the
government, for calculating corporate income tax; and employees (labor organization), to ensure
employee welfare. As a result, management focuses on achieving earnings as a key indicator of its
performance. Therefore, a conflict of interest arises between the stakeholders (the principal) and
management (the agent) regarding the measurement of corporate earnings (Watts and Zimmerman,
1983), which is known as the agency theory effect (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Issues may arise when the earnings of a company are reported asymmetrically (Brealey,
Leland, and Pyle, 1977) and used as a performance measurement tool. According to the agency
problem, management has an incentive to manipulate the reporting of earnings (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). The flexibility of generally accepted accounting principles allows managers to
use accrual accounting, and this affects earnings management as well as the reporting of financial
performance (Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian, 2008).
Several studies have shown the relationship between CG mechanisms and earnings
management by corporate managers (Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta, 2005; Cornett, Marcus, and
Tehranian, 2008; Davidson et al., 2004; Iraya, Mwangi, and Muchoki, 2015, Koh, 2003; Siregar
and Utama, 2008; Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt, 2003). By applying CG mechanisms, a company
can minimize the manipulation of earnings by managers and ensure that the reported performance
best describes the actual economic situation of the company. The implementation of sound CG
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principles (i.e., decline in earnings management) thus has a substantial impact on the quality of
financial statements.
Based on the foregoing, this study investigates the relationship between CG and the
financial performance of a company by assessing the role of earnings management. The focus is
on empirically proving the application of CG as a management control tool to prevent earnings
management by managers. This research contributes to the literature by providing evidence on
how to overcome the conflict of interest between the owners (principal) and managers (agent),
which affects the value and financial performance of the company. The findings recognize the
need to effectively reduce conflicts of interest and motivate managers to improve their
performance and enhance corporate value through corporate financial performance (CFP).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical
framework and research hypotheses, section 3 outlines the methodology, section 4 describes the
data and empirical results, and section 5 provides our concluding remarks.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that earnings management problems can be avoided or
solved by adopting a self-control mechanism based on CG to align the differences in interests
between owners and management, namely. Such mechanisms include the ownership of the
company's shares by management (i.e., managerial ownership) and the institutional ownership of
shares (i.e., institutional ownership). Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian (2009) examined whether
CG mechanisms affect earnings management and financial performance at the largest holding
companies of US public banks, finding that CG mechanisms, board independence, and capital are
positively associated with earnings, which in turn are negatively related to earnings management.
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) concluded that better governance positively and significantly correlates
with higher current and future operating performance. In this study, CG is proxied by managerial
and institutional ownership. Based on the theoretical framework described above, Figure 1
illustrates the approach of this research.

Figure 1. Theoretical framework
CG and CFP
The greater the ownership of managers within a company, the more management is expected to
maximize the company's value and financial performance (Brealey, Leland, and Pyle, 1977;
Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian, 2008, Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian, 2009; Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; McConnell and Servaes, 1990) to prove that CG mechanisms affect firm
performance. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that institutional ownership plays an essential
role in minimizing agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. The existence of
16
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institutional investors can be an effective monitoring mechanism in every decision taken by
managers. McConnell and Servaes (1990) also reported statistically significant relationships
between corporate values and the share ownership of institutional investors. This is because
institutional investors are involved in making strategic decisions to reduce earnings manipulation,
which in turn improves the company's performance. However, Siregar and Utama (2008) found
inconsistent evidence on the impact of institutional ownership, company size, and the practice of
CG on earning management. Alves and Sandra (2012) suggest that both managerial ownership and
ownership concentration improve the quality of annual earnings by reducing the levels of earnings
management. Nonetheless, a good accountant or financial economist pays considerable attention
to the impact of the structure of CG and the compensation scheme on the company's behavior
(Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian, 2008). Hence, the following two hypotheses are proposed:
H1a: Managerial ownership has a significant effect on CFP.
H1b: Institutional ownership has a significant effect on CFP.
CG and Earnings Management
Eisenhardt (1989) identified three assumptions about human nature in agency theory: (1) human
selfishness (self-interest), (2) the limited power of thought about future perceptions (bounded
rationality), and (3) the avoidance of risk (risk aversion). These assumptions suggest that agency
problems arise between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) because humans
act opportunistically by prioritizing personal interests. Institutional ownership allows institutions
to professionally monitor their investment, and the level of control over management actions is so
high that the potential for fraud can be suppressed (Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta, 2005; Cornett,
Marcus, and Tehranian, 2008; Chung, Firth, and Kim, 2002; Koh, 2003).
Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian (2009) tested CG mechanisms that affect earnings and
profit management at the largest public holding company in the United States. They concluded
that adjusting the impact of earnings management substantially increases the importance of CG
variables and reduces the effect of incentive-based compensation on corporate performance.
Further, Abed, Al-Attar, and Suwaidan (2012) confirmed the existence of a significant relationship
between CG mechanisms and earnings management. Abbadi, Hijazi, and Al-Rahahleh (2016)
concluded corporate governance quality has increased over time. Thus, its ability to constrain
earnings management has also increased. Hence, the following two hypotheses are proposed:
H2a:
H2b:

Managerial ownership has a significant effect on earnings management.
Institutional ownership has a significant effect on earnings management.

Mediating Role of Earnings Management
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency costs can be divided into three categories: (1)
monitoring costs, (2) bonding costs, and (3) residual costs. Monitoring costs are incurred by the
company to observe, control, and limit the behavior of agents that could harm the principal.
Bonding costs are incurred by an agent to conform to the interests of the principal, while residual
costs are incurred by the principal in the form of reduced prosperity because of the differences
between agent and principal decisions.
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Agency costs impose a burden on the earnings of the company; the higher agency costs,
the more significant is the reduction in corporate profits. In addition to imposing agency costs on
the company, earnings management can also reduce the value of the firm because of the
opportunistic behavior of managers (Balsam, 2002). The way in which to minimize the supervisory
costs borne by shareholders relies on managerial and institutional ownership (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976).
Several studies have examined the relationship between earnings management and the
information content of earnings and found mixed results. Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995) found
evidence that earnings management leads to a less informed earnings report. Abed, Al-Attar, and
Suwaidan (2012) supported the application of CG principles to control the behavior of the board
of directors, which may distort annual financial statements. These findings suggest that the
reliability and transparency of financial reports can be improved. Hence, the following two
hypotheses are proposed:
H3a:
H3b:

Managerial ownership affects CFP through earnings management.
Institutional ownership affects CFP through earnings management.

METHODS
Research Setting and Sample
To examine these hypotheses, a structural equation modeling (SEM) and partial least squares
(PLS) approach was employed to deal with the multiple dependent and independent variables
simultaneously. PLS can handle relatively small sample sizes and multicollinearity among
independent variables; hence, it does not require the assumption of a normal distribution (Kock,
2011; Hair et al., 2014). In this study, we used Warp–PLS version 06.00 software.
We collected secondary data from the annual report of banking companies listed on the
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2010–2015. The sample was built by using purposive
sampling with the following criteria: (i) banking companies are listed on the IDX and consistently
publish audited financial statements, and (ii) banking companies present managerial and
institutional ownership structures and their financial statements can be accessed through IDX
Corner STIE Indonesia Banjarmasin. Based on these criteria, the final sample comprised 20 banks
and the number of observed data panels was 6×20 = 120.
Variables and Measurements
CFP
CFP was measured by using cash flow return on assets (CFROA), a measure derived from the
results of operations whose funds have been received by the company in cash, with the burden that
the contribution is cash and has been issued by the company. CFROA can be expressed as
CFROA=

EBIT + Dep
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

,

where:
EBIT = earnings before interest and taxes;
Dep = depreciation; and
Assets = total assets.
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Managerial ownership
Managerial ownership is linked to the number of shares owned by management in a company, and
can be expressed as follows:
Managerial ownership percentage =

The number of shares of the manager
The number of outstanding shares

.

Institutional ownership
Institutional ownership is the number of shares owned by an institution in a company. The
proportion of institutional ownership is measured as the percentage of ownership, and can be
expressed as follows:
Institutional ownership percentage =

The number of institutional shares
The number of outstanding shares

.

Earnings management
This research uses modified accruals as in the Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995)
to detect earnings management. Modified accruals assess level estimates as a function of the
difference between revenue changes and changes in the level of property, plants, and equipment.
The model can be described as follows:
a. Total actual accruals:
TAC = NIit – CFit.
where:
NIit = net income of company i in period t; and
CFit = operating cash flow of company i in period t.
Total accruals are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) as follows:
1
Δ SALt
PPEt
TACt
= (β)1
+= (β)2
+ (β)3
+ 𝑒𝑒
TAt − 1
TAt − 1
TAt − 1
TAt − 1

where:
TACt = total accruals in period t;
TAt-1 = total assets in period t-1;
(Δ)SAL = change in revenue or net sales in period t;
PPEt = property, plants, and equipment in period t; and
(β)1, (β)2, and (β)3 = regression coefficients.
b.

Discretionary non-accruals:
1
Δ SALt − ΔRECt
PPEt
NDTACt = (β)1
+= (β)2
+ (β)3
+ 𝑒𝑒
TAt − 1
TAt − 1
TAt − 1

where:
(Δ) RECt = change in accounts receivable in period t; and
(β)1, (β)2, and (β)3 = fitted coefficients obtained from the results of the regression analysis of total
accruals.

19

AABFJ | Vol. 16, No.4, 2022 Rizani, Syam & Lisandri | Mediating Effect of Earnings Management

c.

Discretionary total accruals
TACt
DTACt =
− NDTACt
TAt − 1

where:
DTACt = discretionary total accruals in year t;
TACt = total accruals in year t; and
NDTACt = non-discretionary total accruals in year t.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As shown in Table 1, the mean value of managerial ownership is 0.0499, which indicates that
4.99% of the company's shares are owned by management on average. By contrast, an average of
61.74% of the company's shares are owned by institutions and the average earnings management
of banking companies is 7.19%. Average CFP is 31.06%.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables of interest
Variables
N
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Std. Dev
Managerial ownership (MO)
120
.0107
.3182
.0499
.0817
Institutional ownership (IO)
120
.1076
.9306
.6174
.1911
Earnings management (EM)
120
.0017
.1669
.0719
.0471
CFROA (CFP)
120
.0190
.7340
.3106
.1780
The correlation analysis between the latent variables indicates the presence of a positive
and significant correlation between managerial ownership and CFP (r = 0.148; p-value = 0.038).
A positive and significant correlation is also found between institutional ownership and CFP (r =
0.276; p-value = 0.049). This result suggests that these two variables are essential for explaining
firm performance. The relationship between managerial ownership and earnings management is
negative and significant (r = -0.083; p-value = 0.006). The relationship between institutional
ownership and earnings management is also negative and significant (r = -0.225; p-value = 0,039).
This result indicates that an increase in managerial and institutional ownership decreases earnings
management. The relationship between earnings management and CFP is significant and negative
(r = -0.396; p-value = 0.001); this finding indicates that a decrease in earnings management is
associated with an increase in CFP (see Table 2).
Table 2. Correlation and P values
Correlations among indicators
Indicator correlations
MO
_IO
MO
1.000
_IO
1.000
EM
-0.083
-0.225
CFP
0.148
0.276
P values for correlations
MO
_IO
MO
1.000
<0.001
_IO
<0.001
1.000
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EM
-0.083
-0.225
1.000
-0.396

CFP
0.148
0.276
-0.396
1.000

EM
0.006**
0.039**

CFP
0.038**
0.049**

AABFJ | Vol. 16, No.4, 2022 Rizani, Syam & Lisandri | Mediating Effect of Earnings Management

EM
0.006
0.039
CFP
0.038
0.049
Note:
** Significant at the 0.05 significance level
*** Significant at the 0.01 level of significance

1.000
0.001

0.001***
1.000

Structural Model Analysis
In line with the literature review and research hypotheses tested in this study, the structural model
in Figure 2 was implemented.

Figure 2. Research model
Note: MO = Managerial ownership; IO = Institutional ownership; EM = Earnings management;
CFP = Corporate financial performance.
This study tests the quality and suitability of the model based on the calculation of the
Warp–PLS applications (Table 3). Three main indicators are considered: the average path
coefficient, average R2, and the average block variance inflation factor. The results show that the
quality of the model meets the required criteria.
Table 3. Goodness of fit and quality indices of the model
Model fit and quality indices
Average path coefficient (APC)=0.224, P=0.014
Average R-squared (ARS)=0.350, P=0.002
Average adjusted R-squared (AARS)=0.222, P=0.077
Average block VIF (AVIF)=1.209, acceptable if <= 5, ideally <= 3.3
Average full collinearity VIF (AFVIF)=2.068, acceptable if <= 5, ideally <= 3.3
Tenenhaus GoF (GoF)=0.387, small >= 0.1, medium >= 0.25, large >= 0.36
Sympson's paradox ratio (SPR)=1.000, acceptable if >= 0.7, ideally = 1
R-squared contribution ratio (RSCR)=1.000, acceptable if >= 0.9, ideally = 1
Statistical suppression ratio (SSR)=1.000, acceptable if >= 0.7
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The value of the average path coefficient (0.224) is significant at the 5% level (p-value =
0.014) and average R2 = 0.350; this means that the determinant coefficient is significant at the 5%
level (p-value = 0.002). The value of the average block variance inflation factor is 1.209;
acceptable values should be less than or equal to 5 and, ideally, less than or equal to 3.3. Similarly,
the goodness of fit value is 0.387; acceptable values can be small ≥ 0.1, medium ≥ 0.25, or large
≥ 0.36. This result suggests that the proposed model is supported by relevant and reliable data.
Table 4 shows that the R2 values of both of the endogenous latent variables of EM are 0.23
and of CFP are 0.57. This result suggests that the exogenous variables hypothesized herein have a
positive correlation with the endogenous variables. The variance inflation factors indicate that the
result of the free model testing for multicollinearity bias must be below 3.3 (Kock, 2011). Table 3
shows that each variable has a value below 3.3. Therefore, this research model is free from vertical,
lateral, and common collinearity. In line with Q2 testing procedures, it is useful to test the
predictive validity and relevance of the predictor and criterion variables, with criteria that must be
greater than 0. Table 5 shows that Q2 > 0; in other words, all the model variables are valid.
Table 4. Latent variable coefficients
Latent variable coefficients
R-squared coefficients
Adjusted R-squared coefficients
Full collinearity VIFs
Q-squared coefficients

MO

IO

2.856

2.870

EM
0.23
0.179
1.242
0.229

CFP
0.57
0.196
1.303
0.259

Hypothesis Testing and Discussion
The hypothesis testing procedure comprises two stages (Hair et al., 2014):
1. Verify the direct effects of managerial ownership and institutional ownership on CFP and on
earnings management.
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Figure 3. Direct effect of managerial and institutional ownership on CFP
Based on the results in Figure 3, the effect of managerial ownership on CFP is 0.15 (p-value
= 0.01), while the impact of institutional ownership on CFP is 0.20 (p-value = 0.03). This result
implies that both these variables have a positive and significant effect. Therefore, H1a and H1b are
supported. These results confirm the findings of Abed, Al-Attar, and Suwaidan (2012), Ajinkya,
Bhojraj, and Sengupta, (2005), Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian (2008), Chung, Firth, and Kim
(2002), and Koh (2003).

Figure 4. Direct effect of managerial and institutional ownership on earnings management
As Figure 4 shows, the effect of managerial ownership on earnings management is -0.15
(p-value = 0.031), while the impact of institutional ownership on earnings management is -0.29
(p-value = 0.006). This result shows that both the variables have a negative and significant
influence on earnings management. This finding means that the larger managerial and institutional
ownership, the lower is earnings management. Therefore, H2a and H2b are supported. These results
also support the findings of Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta (2005), Chung, Firth, and Kim (2002),
and McConnell and Servaes (1990).
2. Verify the indirect effects considering the mediating effect of earnings management.
To test the indirect effect of managerial and institutional ownership on CFP through earnings
management, we adopt a structural model. Figure 5 reports the results.
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Figure 5. Estimation of the indirect effects: Structural model
Variance accounted for (VAF) measures the extent to which earnings management absorbs
the direct influence of the exogenous variables on the endogenous variables. A VAF score above
80% indicates full mediation, 20–80% indicates partial mediation, and less than 20% indicates no
mediation (Hair et al., 2014).
Table 5. VAF results
Relationship variable
MOEM CFP

IO EM CFP

Calculation
MOEM: -0,24
EM CFP: -0,31
Indirect effect = -0,24X-0,31
Direct Effect: 0,25
Total effect

Total
-0.55

IOEM: -0,20
EM  CFP: -0,31
Indirect effect = 0,26X0,14
Direct Effect: 0,24
Total effect

-0.51

Category

0,25
-0,30 = -30 %

Partial
mediation

0,24
-0,27 = -27 %

Partial
mediation

The VAF analysis shows that earnings management can act as a partial mediator between
managerial ownership and CFP with the variance of the mediating effect equal to -0.30. The value
of the mediating effect under institutional ownership is also negative. Hence, managerial and
institutional ownership are considered to be proxies for good governance and can improve CFP by
decreasing earnings management by 30% and 27%, respectively. This finding shows the
importance of good governance in avoiding the occurrence of earnings management while
improving company performance. This result is in line with that of Chung, Firth, and Kim (2002),
who concluded that managers' ability to opportunistically exploit earnings management is limited
by the effectiveness of external monitoring by institutional stakeholders or investors. Institutional
investors have the opportunity, resources, and ability to monitor and influence managers and gather
24
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information, monitor management actions, and promote better performance. McConnell and
Servaes (1990) also reported a statistically significant relationship between firm value and the
percentage of institutional ownership.
CONCLUSION
In some circumstances, managers have an incentive to manipulate a company's reported gains by
using discretionary accruals. This profit management practice benefits managers with little or no
(or even negative) benefits to shareholders. Managerial share ownership, through bonuses, can
reduce the manager's incentive to pursue earnings management. The greater managerial
ownership, the more the potential for opportunistic actions by managers, through earnings
management, is reduced. Similarly, institutional ownership helps monitor the accounting choices
made by managers and could force changes if they are believed to be conducting opportunistic
earnings management.
The results of this study provide new empirical evidence in the field of CG. First, our
findings show that managers tend to carry out earnings management, by using discretionary
accruals, for their benefit. Second, managers who own shares in a company are motivated to avoid
or reduce the effects of earnings management to improve CFP without manipulating financial
reporting. Third, institutional investors with a significant shareholding can prevent managers from
using opportunistic discretionary accruals. In other words, managerial and institutional ownership
play a strategic role in achieving good CG.
There are several limitations to this study. First, the analysis focuses on the mechanism of
share ownership, both from the managerial and from the institutional points of view. Hence, it
ignores any other variables or proxies that may contribute to good CG. Second, the sample includes
only banking companies, and the peculiarities of financial institutions are not accounted for in
measuring their performance. Third, the interpretation of the results is not supported by the
personal experience of corporate managers, as the analysis only uses secondary data.
Future research should conduct similar analyses by using a longer and more recent
observation period. Researchers should also consider using a sample of non-banking companies
listed on the IDX and add qualitative reviews that address the personal experiences of corporate
managers. In this way, the conclusions of the research could more easily be generalized.
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